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Background: Many commentators call for a more ethical approach to planning for influenza pandemics. In the
developed world, some pandemic preparedness plans have already been examined from an ethical viewpoint. This
paper assesses the attention given to ethics issues by the Ghana National Integrated Strategic Plan for Pandemic
Influenza (NISPPI).
Methods: We critically analyzed the Ghana NISPPI’s sensitivity to ethics issues to determine how well it reflects
ethical commitments and principles identified in our review of global pandemic preparedness literature, existing
pandemic plans, and relevant ethics frameworks.
Results: This paper reveals that important ethical issues have not been addressed in the Ghana NISPPI. Several
important ethical issues are unanticipated, unacknowledged, and unplanned for. These include guidelines on
allocation of scarce resources, the duties of healthcare workers, ethics-sensitive operational guidelines/protocols,
and compensation programs. The NISPPI also pays scant attention to use of vaccines and antivirals, border issues
and cooperation with neighboring countries, justification for delineated actions, and outbreak simulations. Feedback
and communication plans are nebulous, while leadership, coordination, and budgeting are quite detailed. With
respect to presentation, the NISPPI’s text is organized around five thematic areas. While each area implicates ethical
issues, NISPPI treatment of these areas consistently fails to address them.
Conclusions: Our analysis reveals a lack of consideration of ethics by the NISPPI. We contend that, while the plan’s
content and fundamental assumptions provide support for implementation of the delineated public health actions,
its consideration of ethical issues is poor. Deficiencies include a failure to incorporate guidelines that ensure fair
distribution of scarce resources and a lack of justification for delineated procedures. Until these deficiencies are
recognized and addressed, Ghana runs the risk of rolling out unjust and ethically indefensible actions with real
negative effects in the event of a pandemic. Soliciting inputs from the public and consultation with ethicists during
the next revision of the NISPPI will be useful in addressing these issues.
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During the last century, the world’s population expe-
rienced one devastating influenza pandemic and three
less severe global outbreaks. First was the Spanish in-
fluenza in 1918 (A/H1N1); the Asian influenza occurred in
1957 (H2N2); and the Hong Kong influenza in 1968
(H3N2) [1,2]. The Swine flu pandemic occurred in 2009
(HIN1/09) [3]. Even though no public health expert can* Correspondence: alaar@ug.edu.gh
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unless otherwise stated.predict with certainty the timing and severity of the next
outbreak, there is general agreement that future pan-
demics are perhaps inevitable [4].
With this understanding, the World Health Organization
(WHO) periodically publishes recommendations for coun-
tries to use in their own preparations. Previous ones
include “the role of WHO and recommendations for na-
tional measures before and during pandemics” [5], and a
checklist for influenza preparedness, both released in 2005
[6]. In 2006, the WHO released a protocol for rapid re-
sponse and containment [7], and a draft protocol for rapid
response and containment of pandemic influenza in 2007ntral. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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pandemic have been proceeding worldwide. The level of
preparedness, however, varies from place to place.
For example, in November 2005 the US laid out a
broad national strategy for pandemic response [9]. This
was followed by a more detailed pandemic influenza
plan in 2006 [10]. In the state of Minnesota for example,
the legislature authorized $4.085 million in 2007 to im-
prove the state’s preparedness for pandemic influenza.
The Minnesota Department of Health was advised to
spend $3.97 million of this funding to purchase antiviral
medication and to stockpile medical supplies [11].
Preparations in resource-constrained settings are usually
thin, focusing on public health actions and goals. Little if
any attention is given to ethics considerations. We use the
Republic of Ghana’s pandemic preparedness plan as
an illustrative example. The Ghana National Integrated
Strategic Plan for Pandemic Influenza for 2009 – 2013
(NISPPI) is the government’s paper outlining its prepared-
ness strategies [12]. The NISPPI addresses five main
themes - planning and coordination; surveillance and situ-
ation monitoring; prevention, containment and manage-
ment; communication; and social mitigation. In the recent
past, the plan has been critiqued for deficiencies in epi-
demiological content and other concerns [13,14]. Sambala
criticizes the vaccine/antiviral strategies of Ghana, Malawi,
and Tanzania pandemic plans as unclear and inadequate –
lacking an epidemiological explanation as to why certain
groups are at high risk. Norman et al. do not consider the
level of risk used in estimating direct health threat in the
event of an outbreak acceptable risk. They do not offer
what level of risk is acceptable. Both the 2006 influenza
preparedness and response plan [15] and the current
NISPPI [12] contain assumptions about the direct health
threat in the event of an outbreak. Both project the num-
ber of clinical cases and deaths in Ghana in the event of a
Phase 5 pandemica using gross attack rates of between
15% and 40%, and case fatality rates (CFR) between 0.6%
and 1.5%. Based on Ghana’s present population of ap-
proximately 25 million, even these conservative assump-
tions show a real potential for significant mortality (22,500
deaths) in an influenza pandemic. Clinical cases will far
exceed what the country’s health infrastructure and so-
phistication can handle.
Furthermore, the overall cost of actions deemed neces-
sary to prepare the health care delivery system to re-
spond to human avian influenza was estimated to be
about $11,000,000 [12]. The actual amount that was re-
leased to relevant ministries, departments and agencies
(MDAs) is unknown but is guessed to be an insignificant
fraction.
Aside from these general challenges, we hypothesized
that the NISPPI would be deficient in ethics content.
Hyder et al. [16] have noted that, while ethics isgradually being integrated into public health policy in
the developed world, ethical considerations are often
undervalued or even ignored by the public health pol-
icies of developing countries.
Arguments for the inclusion of ethics in pandemic
planning have been made in the past, albeit primarily in
relation to plans from the developed world. Jaro Kotalik
offers an ethical analysis of the pandemic plans of
Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States [17].
Thompson et al. [18] proposed an ethical framework for
pandemic influenza planning, but their framework does
not reflect developing world realities. Thomas et al. ana-
lyzed the US federal and state plans for evidence of ethical
guidance [19]. Patel et al. proposed a framework, which
they used to appraise pandemic plans from Australia,
England, USA, New Zealand and Canada [20]. DeBruin
et al., drawing on their experiences from the public en-
gagement process of Minnesota Pandemic Ethics Project,
share strategies on how to achieve social justice goals in
pandemic response [21].
Papers that have considered preparedness plans from
resource poor settings [13,14,22,23] have not adequately
addressed ethics issues. In the developing world, ethical
issues seem to be ignored in public health programming
and even in scholastic discourse. Lisa Eckenwiler argues
that, in the absence of explicit ethical analysis, prepared-
ness policies are unlikely to deal adequately with ethical
issues – underscoring the importance of ethical review
in every pandemic preparedness planning process [24].
Taking a cue from the warning of Thomas et al. that
“history will judge our generation’s response to the next
pandemic in large part by our ability to act ethically” [19],
our paper aims to first assess how sensitive the Ghana
NISPPI is to ethics matters. Second, by highlighting the
negative implications of such insensitivity on real people
in the event of a pandemic, the paper initiates a debate on
the utility of including ethics in pandemic preparedness.
Methods
Assessment of ethics sensitivity of the NISPPI
We assessed how sensitive the Ghana NISPPI is to ethics
issues by critically analyzing it to determine how well it re-
flects ethical commitments and principles identified in our
review of the global pandemic preparedness literature, exis-
ting pandemic plans, as well as relevant ethics frameworks.
We also drew on lessons from SARS, and the 2009-influenza
pandemic. See Table 1 for a summary of our review of the
literature, highlighting ethical issues addressed therein.
Results and discussion
The framework for preparedness and response to
pandemic influenza in Ghana
Developed using a framework recommended by the
WHO [25], and thus organized into five thematic areas,
Table 1 Ethics sensitivity parameters
# Ethics sensitivity parameter Definition Source
Decision making process: Preparedness decision-making is deliberative and all-inclusive, with
public consultations. Decisions are publicly defensible, which
means that decisions are open to scrutiny and the basis upon
which decisions are made are publicly accessible to affected
stakeholders.
[18,32]
Justification for delineated actions: All planned actions/activities are adequately explained and justified [17,23]
Composition of national pandemic planning committee: Committee formation process is deliberative and composition is
all-inclusive with members from national, regional, and district
levels; membership include technical and lay person
[23,32]
Communication to at risk population/Information symmetry: Efforts are outlined in the plan to keep the public continuously
informed on all aspects of the planned interventions. Differential
messages for various audiences are developed and are culturally
and scientifically appropriate, pandemic phase alerts are
incorporated into the communication machinery.
[17,23,43]
Prioritization, and allocation of scarce resources: Triage systems for priority setting in providing critical care, or for
allocation of scarce resources (vaccines, intensive care units,
hospital beds, human resource allocation, and staffing) during a
pandemic are clearly outlined. Plan establishes priority groups
nuanced by local contexts
[17,32,43-45]
Healthcare worker duty to care adequately explained: Plan addresses healthcare worker duty to provide care in
pandemic circumstances. That is the issue of special obligations of
health care professionals during an outbreak. Are the rights and
responsibilities of health care professionals especially in the
context of pandemic flu preparedness clarified?
[17,32,43,46]
Limitations of proposed interventions: Plan frankly acknowledges limitations of various proposed actions
or interventions (both pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical)
[42]
Leadership and coordination Plan indicates which agencies will lead various components/
actions of the plan
[23,32]
Facilities designation Facilities where patients would be treated are clearly identifies or
designated
[23]
Stockpiling of antiviral, vaccines and personal protective
equipment:
Provisions are made for national stockpiling of antivirals, vaccines,
and personnel protective equipment; and such provisions are
sensitive to locale-specific competing demands
[17,23,43]
Ethics training for healthcare workers Plan adequately outlines pandemic-specific ethics training for
various categories of people working in healthcare setting
[23]
Timelines for planned activities: Timelines are explicitly defined for all activities outlined in the plan [23]
Border issues, travel advisories, and trade policies Plan explicitly and adequately addresses cooperation with
neighboring countries.
[23,32,43]
Co-operation with the WHO other development partners,
and sister countries
Plan acknowledges the essence of cooperating with these
institutions
[23,32]
Ethics consideration in clinical protocols: Plan-specific operational guidelines/protocols are developed and
are ethics-sensitive
[23]
Use of vaccines and antivirals: Guidelines are issued on how antiviral, vaccines, personal
protective equipment should be used during an outbreak
(different from allocations). Logistical infrastructure for rapid
distribution of stockpiled antivirals, vaccines, and personal
protective equipment are in place.
[23,32,43]
Plan review mechanism: Plan explicitly states a mechanism for continuous review and
updates
[23]
Continuity of essential services: There is evidence of planning to ensure continuity of essential
services including non-health sector essential services such as
ensuring business continuity, capacity for corpse disposal etc.
[43]
Considerations of equity, social justice, vulnerable groups: Plan addresses special needs of vulnerable and disadvantaged
groups
[21]
Home care management of infected patients: Plan recommends home care management of infected patients,
and provides guidelines
[23]
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Table 1 Ethics sensitivity parameters (Continued)
Social solidarity considerations: Plans on how to manage complex social spaces are described,
importance of social “solidarity” during a pandemic is
acknowledged and communicated
[18,43]
Solidarity requires: good, open and honest communication, open
collaboration, in a spirit of common purpose, within and between
health care institutions, sharing public health information,
coordinating health care delivery, transfer of patients, and
deployment of human and material resources
Plan adaptability/flexibility: Outlined actions are flexible and encourage evidence-informed
modification as required. That is opportunities to revisit and revise
decisions as new information emerges throughout the crisis as
well as mechanisms to address disputes and complaints are there.
[18,43]
Preventive ethics consideration Preparedness actions ably balances emergency ethics and
preventive ethics
[46]
Budgeting considerations: Plan has a budget and sources of funding are indicated [23]
Outbreak simulations: Outbreak simulations are incorporated into preparedness activities [23]
Back up essential personnel The need for identification and recruitment of additional essential
personnel during pandemic outbreak is acknowledged and
planned for
[23]
Ethical framework for the plan: There is a specific ethical framework developed to guide the plan’s
implementation
[18,19,47]
Privacy considerations Plans acknowledges individual rights to privacy, and provides
justifications for privacy rights bridging
[23,32]
Proportionality of response: Guidance exists in the plan to ensure responses to threat are
proportional and measured. That is restrictions to individual liberty
are carefully thought through and measures taken to protect the
public from harm do not exceed what is necessary to address the
actual level of risk to, or critical need of, the community.
[18,43]
Compensation programs There are mechanisms in place to ensure that ethical decision-
making is sustained throughout the crisis, and measures to cater
for the social and economic cost of poultry destruction, market
closure, e.t.c. are outlined.
[18,22,48]
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and response structures and mechanisms. Ghana has
in the past responded to threats from Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Avian Influenza by
producing response guidelines, albeit basic ones [15].
The five thematic areas of the current framework are
summarized and discussed.
Planning and coordination
The planning and coordination component of the plan
aims to provide high-level political support for the acti-
vation and implementation of the national integrated
strategic plan for pandemic influenza. It promises in-
volvement and commitment of all sectors, and provision
of resources for efficient operationalization of the plan.
The plan is tiered at three levels: the first is the national
coordinating committee, the second tier is the national
technical coordinating committee and the third, regional
and district committees. The Ghana National Disaster
Management Organization (NADMO) leads the National
Coordinating Committee (NCC). The relevant MDAs iden-
tified in the plan are Ministries of Interior, Finance, Health,
Food and Agriculture, Transport and Communications,Information, Employment and Social Welfare, Local
Government and Rural Development, Defense, Environ-
ment Science and Technology. The Resident Coordinator
of the UN System and a conglomeration of international
state and non-state actors referred to as development
partners are also recognized as partners in planning and
coordination.
A careful reading of the NISPPI, however, reveals that
some important planning and coordination actions are
either not covered at all or not adequately addressed.
These relate to decision making processes, justification for
delineated actions, membership of pandemic planning
committees, allocation of scarce resources, timelines for
planned activities, border control and co-operation with
development partners, among others.
Plans elsewhere [9,10,26] and pandemic-specific ethical
frameworks [19,20,27,28] encourage that preparedness de-
cision making be deliberative and all-inclusive, with public
consultations [29], and that all planned actions including
social distancing and other restrictions on individual liber-
ties be adequately explained and justified. These issues are
not explicitly addressed in NISPPI. Guidance on allocating
scarce resources (vaccines, intensive care units, hospital
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systems for priority setting in providing critical care du-
ring a pandemic are absent from the plan. It is generally
encouraged that pandemic plans establish priority groups
nuanced by local contexts [30]. The other required plan-
ning actions that are not addressed include clear indica-
tion of agencies to lead the coordination and maintenance
of essential services, and designation of facilities where pa-
tients should be treated in the event of a pandemic.
Ethics training particularly for healthcare workers is
another essential planning action [31]. The current plan
does not outline any pandemic-specific ethics training for
people working in health care facilities. The plan does not
appear to address cooperation with neighboring countries.
Ethics-sensitive operational guidelines/protocols are ab-
sent, and so are pandemic plan review and update mecha-
nisms. Feedback and planned communication plans were
nebulous. However, we praise the plan for including an
estimated budget and for acknowledging the importance
of cooperating with the WHO and other development
partners.
The question of who gets to make key decisions in a na-
tional public health emergency is an important ethical
consideration. In an open democratic society, the deve-
lopment of socially significant approaches such as pan-
demic preparedness plans ought to follow democratic and
deliberative processes. As Jaro Kotalik argues, fairness
requires that those who will be affected have a say in the
decision making process [17]. Thus in planning, provi-
sions need to be made for input from various groups such
as ordinary community members, healthcare workers, bio-
ethicists, and public policy advisors, among others [27,29].
A careful reading of the NISPPI reveals that its develop-
ment did not employ deliberative procedures of commu-
nity engagement. All the contributors to the plan were
technical personnel from various ministries, departments
and agencies. These included the Ghana Health Service,
the Ministry of Health, Veterinary Services/Ministry of
Food and Agriculture, Wildlife Division/Ministry of Lands,
Forestry and Mines, Noguchi Memorial Institute for
Medical Research of the University of Ghana, NADMO,
Ministry of the Interior, WHO, FAO, United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), and
Quality Health Partners. This process denied the ordinary
Ghanaian a voice in the development of the plan. There
were no public hearings.
Pandemic preparedness plans should incorporate feed-
back into the development process. According to avail-
able global guidelines [32], (1) all stakeholders should be
represented during pandemic preparedness meetings; (2)
these meetings should occur at different levels (national,
regional and local) for both health and non-health sectors;
(3) overarching coordinating teams should be present
at meetings; and (4) effective communication channelsshould be established across sectors and among stake-
holder levels. Both intra- and inter-sectoral cooperation
and coordination are encouraged. Incorporation of a
communication plan and multiple plan revisions and ad-
aptations improve the feedback process. Last, but most
important, information about the planning process and
the people/organizations involved in it should be com-
municted to the public. The current NISPPI lacks these
provisions.
Surveillance and situation monitoring
The surveillance and monitoring component of the plan
aims to build national, regional and district capacity for
early detection of and response to pandemic influenza.
Strengthening of laboratory capacity for virus charac-
terization in addition to rapid confirmation of suspected
cases of pandemic influenza are mentioned as actionable
strategies. Also mentioned, without elaboration under
this section, is the provision of guidance on how to de-
velop policies for antivirals and vaccine. The plan de-
signates the Ministry of Health’s Disease Surveillance
Department as coordinator of all surveillance activities.
The plan mandates the Ghana Health Service to employ
its structures from community through to the national
levels to investigate and respond to any suspected cases
of human influenza.
This section fails to provide ethics justifications for
proposed actions. Moreover, the plan is silent on coope-
ration with neighboring countries, even though border
control is an essential surveillance action. While coope-
ration with the WHO and other development partners
are valuable, this should not be a substitute for delinea-
tion of surveillance-specific border control guidance in
the NISPPI.
Communication
Drafters of the NISPPI envisaged that communication
initiatives will increase the general public’s awareness
and understanding of pandemic influenza and prepared-
ness plans. Communications strategies can, for example,
promote behavior change to reduce the risk of trans-
mission. Pandemic plans should ensure coordinated and
consistent communications at all times between autho-
rities in all sectors and with the public. The NISPPI
establishes a communication sub-committee with the
Ministry of Information as the lead agency. Senior level
representatives from Ministry of Information, NADMO,
the Media, National Commission on Civic Education
(NCCE), Health Promotion Departments of MOH/GHS
and WHO are listed as members of the yet to be estab-
lished committee.
However, the NISPPI outlines no measures to keep the
public informed on planned interventions and justifica-
tions for them. Pre-pandemic development of differential
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teachers, religious authorities, villagers, healthcare pro-
viders, market women, etc.) would foster more effective
communication, but the NISPPI does not address such
strategies. There is also no mention of pandemic phase
alerts in the communication section of the plan.
Pandemic influenza plans, by their nature, must pay
considerable attention to communication needs among
various levels of government and related institutions [33].
Authors of the plan also note that its success will rest on
clear and consistent communication about the pandemic
and its risks to the Ghanaian population. Drafters of the
NISPPI feel it is reasonable to initiate communication
process only when an outbreak occurs. The principles of
transparency and accountability require that those who
are going to be affected be informed not only during the
pandemic but be engaged from the development of the
preparedness plans [27,29]. Civic engagement and fair
processes are requirements in every phase of pandemic
preparedness planning. Lessons from existing guidelines
and frameworks [19,20] show that effective communica-
tion among health care professionals and the public could
be achieved by integrating communication aspects into all
planning, preparedness and response activities. For in-
stance, key institutions or spokespersons for disseminating
information to the public need to be identified prior to the
pandemic and they need to give clear, consistent and bal-
anced messages. Plans for evaluating how information is
received and perceived by health care providers, the public
and other stakeholders need to be included in the NISPPI.
Prevention, containment, management and social
mitigation
The objectives of the prevention, containment, and man-
agement component of the plan are stated as follows: to
reduce the risk of animal to human transmissions; to re-
duce the risk of co-infections in humans to minimize
opportunities for virus re-assortment that could generate
lethal strains of influenza virus; and to stockpile anti-
virals, vaccines, protective equipment and other logistics
for efficient deployment. The Ministry of Health and the
Ghana Health Service are designated as the responsible
agencies.
The goal of social mitigation is to enable functioning
of key systems and services (e.g. utilities, health delivery,
security) during various phases of the pandemic by en-
couraging business continuity planning by both public
and private sector agencies. Voluntary home quarantine
of members of households with confirmed or probable
influenza case(s) will be promoted. The NISSPI states
that antiviral medications will be offered to those qua-
rantined for prophylactic use. The plan addresses the
use of social distancing as a measure to reduce contacts
between individuals in the community and workplace.Cancellation of large public gatherings and suspension
of markets are options. NADMO is designated to lead
the humanitarian response, and to be supported by the
Ghana Red Cross Society (GRCS), ministry of food and
agriculture (MOFA), the Nutrition Department of the
Ghana Health Service, and the MOH. Ghana’s deve-
lopment partners, the UN System, private sector, and
NGOs are mentioned as partners. With respect to re-
sources needed to implement the plan, the NISPPI iden-
tifies the Government of Ghana and five development
partners (USAID, FAO, WHO, UNDP, EU) as sources of
resources and/or technical assistance.
The NISPPI fails to provide an ethical framework to
justify and guide these interventions. Moreover, alloca-
tion of scarce resources and healthcare worker duty to
care, are either not mentioned or poorly addressed in
the plan.
One of the chief ethical issues raised by both the 1918
influenza pandemic and also by the SARS outbreak in
2003 was the recurring tension in public health between
the rights of individual liberties versus public health pro-
motion [34]. Questions surrounding isolation, quaran-
tine, and application of police power are relevant in this
context. Even though the NISSPI mentions that quarantine
and other standstill measures will be invoked immediately
when the Minister declares an outbreak, the plan does not
address the ethical questions associated with such inter-
ventions. Available records from Colonial Ghana amplify
the need for such ethical questions to be addressed. The
records indicate that social distancing methods including
segregation were attempted; not only did officials close
schools and ban public meetings, they also restricted the
police and clerical workers from doing their duties [35].
The towns of Larwa, Tumu, and Wa in the Upper West
Region of current Ghana clearly abused patients by remo-
ving them from their homes and isolating them to inha-
bitable huts on the fringes of the infected villages, and the
larger towns and villages were completely sectioned off
[36]. Food, water, and necessary supplies could only be
placed outside the camps and only the attendants could
come out to collect these items for the patients inside. In
the northern territories and Ashanti, the Colonial adminis-
tration constructed fences around infected towns, placed
markets outside their borders, and directed traffic to alter-
native trade routes [36]. Some commentators on the sub-
ject have argued that if individuals are required to forgo
certain liberties, fairness should be a prime consideration
[34]. Nowhere in the NISPPI is this issue addressed.
Second, the NISSPI’s plan to stockpile antiviral agents or
vaccines is charged with ethical conundrums. Questions
such as the basis for decisions to stockpile antiviral agents
versus procuring medical supplies needed for immediate
use are ethically relevant. Stockpiling of antiviral agents is a
key part of national influenza pandemic preparedness in
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for pandemic plans in resource-constrained settings. The
current NISSPI has cost estimates on procuring pharma-
ceuticals and other supplies. This is estimated to be
$709,750. It is reasonable to expect that a justification for
this expenditure be provided when a significant proportion
of the country’s population is in serious need for basic med-
ical supplies such as antimalarial and antiretroviral drugs.
How are ethical issues associated with triaging and
allocation of scarce resources during a pandemic dealt
with in the NISSPI? Many countries, especially deve-
loping countries, will be forced to confront the next
pandemic with few or no available vaccines or other re-
sources. According to global estimates, a pandemic, if
severe, could lead to too many sick people all over the
world, all requiring care at the same time [4]. Should
this happen in Ghana, the already inadequate human
and material resources of the Ghana health services will
be further and rapidly overstretched. Based on expe-
riences elsewhere, many of the sick will recover with
minimal assistance, but others will be seriously ill and
require prolonged hospitalization, diagnostic facilities,
multiple drugs, and aid from health personnel if they are
to have a chance to survive [17]. Even though Ghana
would not have enough antivirals and related resources,
the NISSPI does not recognize the need to provide
guidelines on how to ethically allocate very scarce re-
sources during a pandemic.
The NISSPI provides no guidance to address the
ethical issue of health care worker duty to care in pan-
demic circumstance. Every pandemic plan should ad-
dress the question of whether practitioners are obligated
to treat patients with a highly contagious disease, thus
putting themselves and their families, acquaintances, or
anyone else they contact at risk. For example, research
publications have mentioned the high transmissibility to
nurses and frontline physicians in Southeast Asia during
the SARS outbreak [37,38]. Wenzel et al. report that
about 50% of those who died from SARS were health-
care workers who had come in contact with infected pa-
tients in hospitals [38]. Chua et al. recorded that fear
and anxiety-induced psychiatric morbidity was a major
problem among healthcare workers involved in SARS
treatment [39]. Drawing from these experiences, others
have warned that an influenza pandemic will impose
similar foreseeable risks to physicians and other health-
care workers [40]. This raises an ethical dilemma about
the extent of the professional duty of caregivers during a
pandemic versus the limits to health risk to themselves
and to their families that healthcare workers need accept
[41]. It may be argued that if provided with the appro-
priate equipment or supplies necessary to treat, practi-
tioners should be obligated to treat someone with any
illness. The NISPPI mentions procuring and distributingprotective clothing, masks, aprons, and gloves. This is
laudable; however, being prepared requires not only that
health workers are aware that they have masks that they
can use during a pandemic but also that they have the
requisite training on how to use personal protective
equipment safely and effectively. Indeed, it is required of
planners to acknowledge limitations of various proposed
actions or interventions (both pharmaceutical and non-
pharmaceutical) [42]. The NISPPI does not address these
issues.
Recommendations
We applaud the organization of the text of the NISPPI
around the WHO’s five thematic areas. However, each of
these five themes – planning and coordination; surveil-
lance and situation monitoring; prevention, containment
and management; communication; and social mitigation –
are infused with ethical issues. Unfortunately, NISPPI does
not attend to these issues as it plans in relation to the
themes. We recommend that the Ghana Ministry of
Interior, Ministry of Health and their partners incorporate
ethics into their pandemic preparedness efforts. This
could be done by introducing a running sixth theme on
ethics. This ethics theme could be applied more systema-
tically to the five categories - acting as a lens on the other
five categories. Seeking public input and consultation with
ethicists during plan development or revisions will prove
useful in addressing these deficiencies.
Although all the ethics deficiencies identified are rele-
vant, we would prioritize efforts that aim at improving
the decision making process, providing guidance on
healthcare worker duty to care, and nuanced stockpiling
of and prioritized allocation plans for antiviral, vaccines
and personal protective equipment. We especially flag
planning actions that contribute to equity, social justice,
and respect for vulnerable groups as important. Pre-
paredness decision-making could be made deliberative
and all-inclusive through public and stakeholder input
and consultation with ethicists. Adequate public and
stakeholder engagement would ensure that the stock-
piling and allocation of resources are sensitive to locale-
specific competing demands. The plan must address
special needs of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups
and institute measures to ensure that responses to threat
are proportional and measured.
Limitations of the analysis
The findings of this analysis are subject to a number of
limitations, which are worth noting. First, given the vola-
tility of the local public health, somewhat time-fixed
plans may exist alongside other national or sub-national
guidelines undergoing constant revisions. Such guide-
lines, if they do exist, did not form part of this analysis.
The second limitation relates to the fact that the quality
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tual amount of attention ethics will receive in an in-
fluenza pandemic are distinct. Though an important
indicator of her sensitivity to ethics, the quality or other-
wise of emphasis to ethics in the NISPPI is one among
many elements. We note therefore that our analysis of
plans is an incomplete but important assessment of the
ethics sensitivity of Ghana’s preparedness for influenza
pandemic.
Conclusions
Notwithstanding the many strengths of the NISPPI in
terms of its public health content, guidance on how to ad-
dress ethical issues during a pandemic remains nascent.
Lack of guidelines to ensure fair allocation of scarce re-
sources during a pandemic, failure to justify proposals for
procuring and stockpiling pharmaceuticals and other
medical supplies, and failure to justify delineated pre-
paredness actions are deficiencies. Until the deficiencies
are recognized and addressed, Ghana runs the risk of rol-
ling out unjust and ethically indefensible actions with real
negative effects on people in the event of a pandemic
threat. Soliciting input from the public and consultation
with ethicists during next revision of the NISPPI will be
useful in addressing these issues.
Endnote
aA scenario that would result from the world progres-
sing to Phase 5 of the pandemic with the appearance of
a viral strain capable of rapid and effective human-to-
human transmission. In this scenario the virus could ar-
rive in Ghana via migratory birds but also (and perhaps
more plausibly) by the arrival in Ghana of infected indi-
viduals traveling from other countries.
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